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Abstract. Countermeasures against kernel vulnerability attacks on an
operating system (OS) are highly important kernel features. Some
kernels adopt several kernel protection methods such as mandatory
access control, kernel address space layout randomization, control flow
integrity, and kernel page table isolation; however, kernel vulnerabilities
can still be exploited to execute attack codes and corrupt kernel memory.
To accomplish this, adversaries subvert kernel protection methods and
invoke these kernel codes to avoid administrator privileges restrictions
and gain complete control of the target host. To prevent such subversion,
we present Multiple Kernel Memory (MKM), which offers a novel security
mechanism using an alternative design for kernel memory separation that
was developed to reduce the kernel attack surface and mitigate the effects
of illegal data manipulation in the kernel memory. The proposed MKM
is capable of isolating kernel memory and dedicates the trampoline page
table for a gateway of page table switching and the security page table
for kernel protection methods.The MKM encloses the vulnerable kernel
code in the kernel page table. The MKM mechanism achieves complete
separation of the kernel code execution range of the virtual address
space on each page table. It ensures that vulnerable kernel code does
not interact with different page tables. Thus, the page table switching of
the trampoline and the kernel protection methods of the security page
tables are protected from vulnerable kernel code in other page tables.
An evaluation of MKM indicates that it protects the kernel code and
data on the trampoline and security page tables from an actual kernel
vulnerabilities that lead to kernel memory corruption. In addition, the
performance results show that the overhead is 0.020 µs to 0.5445 µs, in
terms of the system call latency and the application overhead average is
196.27 µs to 6,685.73 µs , for each download access of 100,000 Hypertext
Transfer Protocol sessions.
1 Introduction
Kernel vulnerability attacks are highly consequential and compromising
processes in which an adversary takes control of the administrator account
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through privilege escalation in the operating system (OS); to prevent this, the
kernel must adopt protection methods.
Several kernel protection methods have been implemented, including stack
monitoring of the kernel code [1], verification of kernel code control flow
integration (CFI) to prevent the use of the return oriented programming (ROP)
technique [2], system call isolation (SCI) for the creation of page table that
contains necessity only kernel code at the system call invocation to prevent
ROP attack selects an execution piece from the entire kernel code [3], kernel
address space layout randomization (KASLR) to randomize the layout of the
kernel code and data on the kernel memory [4], and the virtual address space
separation method isolates the kernel memory to the kernel and the user page
tables, to prevent meltdown side channel attacks from a user process (e.g., kernel
page table isolation (KPTI) for Linux [5]). At the CPU layer, supervisor mode
access prevention (SMAP) prevents access to the user memory region, whereas
supervisor mode execution prevention (SMEP) prevents the execution of code
in the user memory region of the virtual address space in the supervisor [6].
Privilege escalation leads to kernel vulnerability attacks; it employs an illegal
memory corruption effect to overwrite privileged information variables on kernel
memory. Although kernel protection methods restrict administrator privileges,
the adversary also subverts kernel protection methods (e.g., achieving access
control of SELinux [7]) to modify the kernel code and data on the kernel page
table [8, 9]. Moreover, kernel memory observer (KMO) involves the segregation
of specific kernel codes as dedicated page tables [10]. Although, kernel protection
methods calling kernel codes (e.g., the page table switching) need to be assigned
to same virtual address space with vulnerable kernel code, the placement of
kernel protection methods calling is the remaining of kernel attack surface.
This poses a threat to the kernel protection methods at the kernel layer.
To mitigate this and protect specific kernel codes against kernel vulnerability
attack targets, another perspective is necessary to ensure that the environment
supports the limitations of kernel vulnerability attacks, thereby reducing the
damage caused to the target kernel memory region.
In this study, we proposed a novel security mechanism called “Multiple Kernel
Memory (MKM)”, which enhances the resistance capabilities of the kernel using
multiple page tables, thereby mitigating kernel vulnerability attacks that subvert
kernel protection methods and these kernel code calling placement. An overview
of the proposed security mechanism is presented below:
– MKM introduces an additional boundary of kernel code execution involving
two page tables: trampoline and security. The gateway of page table
switching feature is assigned and executed on the trampoline, then the kernel
protection methods are dedicated and executed on the security page tables.
A majority of the kernel code is confined to the kernel page table, and the
remainder of the kernel code is stored in the user page table.
– To reduce the kernel attack surface and achieve isolation of the kernel code
accessible range, a separation of the virtual address space is required. The
MKM mechanism realizes that the potentiality of vulnerable kernel code
is enforced to execute to only the virtual address space of the kernel page
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Fig. 1. Overview of page table structure (Linux x86 64) [11]
table. Thus, it eliminates the risk of memory corruption of the gateway of
page table switching and the kernel protection methods that are stored on
the trampoline and security page tables.
Here, the MKM was implemented on the Linux kernel using KPTI and SCI,
and the kernel observation mechanism was executed. During evaluation, MKM
mitigated the illegal modifications to the kernel code of the protection methods
and page table switching function, and such instances were identified. The main
contributions of the study are summarized below:
1. We present MKM, which is a novel kernel memory separation mechanism
that is designed to specifically protect kernel protection methods at the
kernel layer. We also discuss the threat model, capability, and limitation
of MKM, which achieves resilience to kernel vulnerability attacks.
2. We evaluate the efficacy of the implementing MKM based on actual kernel
vulnerability CVE-2017-16995 [12] Proof-of-Concepts (PoC) code attacks
SELinux and the page table switching kernel code of the MKM. Both
cases were identified via the kernel observation mechanism. The performance
evaluation results indicate that the MKM overhead is from 0.020 µs to 0.5445
µs for each system call round time, and the application overhead average is
from 196.27 µs to 6,685.73 µs for each HTTP download access.
2 Background
2.1 Virtual Address Space and Page Table
The design and implementation of the MKMwas realized on a target architecture
of is x86 64 and the operating system used is Linux kernel. The page table
structure manages multiple tables and pages for handling the virtual address
space (Figure 1). The length of the virtual address is 48 bits, the page size is 4
Kbytes, and CR3 register is the physical address of the page table in the Linux
x86 64 architecture. The page table maintains the page entry mechanism, which
assigns the relationships between the physical and virtual addresses of each page
on the page table.
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2.2 Kernel vulnerability attack
Kernel memory corruption through kernel vulnerability is a common type of
attack [13]. The OS and CPU manages a privilege level to protect the kernel
code or data, whereas KASLR / CFI provides hardening of the kernel against
exploitation attacks from user processes, and SMAP / SMEP restricts malicious
codes in the user memory region from the kernel mode execution.
Privilege escalation is the goal of a process that intends to compromise the
kernel. It enables the reading and writing of kernel information by corrupting the
kernel memory. To avoid OS and CPU protection methods, the adversary needs
to execute the arbitrary program code to gain complete administrator privileges
at the kernel layer by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities in the kernel.
To achieve privilege escalation on Linux, the adversary force-calls the
kernel functions commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred to gain access to
root privileges. Moreover, the adversary directory overwrites the uid variable
of the cred structure on the kernel memory. To subvert the Linux kernel
protection methods, the adversary directory overwrites the Linux security
module (LSM) function pointer value of the security_hook_list that invokes
different non-checking access control methods in the kernel code or changes
the security context variable to escape a mandatory access control (MAC)
mechanism (e.g., SELinux) restrictions [8, 9].
2.3 Isolation of Virtual Address Space
The CPU and kernel protection mechanisms prohibit user processes from
referring to the virtual address space of the kernel memory. The adversary has
to escape these restrictions for the privilege escalation and the subversion of the
kernel protection methods.
A meltdown side channel attack indicates that a user process can refer
to virtual addresses of the kernel memory without the use of any kernel
protection methods (e.g., KASLR). Therefore, an adversary uses this virtual
address information to execute an arbitrary program for performing a kernel
vulnerability attack, using the ROP technique. Moreover, the meltdown
countermeasure method (e.g., Linux KPTI [5]) provides the page table to the
user mode and kernel mode for virtual address space isolation.
Additionally, in the ROP countermeasure method (e.g., Linux SCI [3]), an
independent page table for the kernel memory with minimum kernel codes
is innovated from user process data to execute a system call. SCI limits the
ROP technique and creates and executes a malicious code that concatenates
code snippets from the complete kernel codes on kernel memory. Moreover,
the KMO involves additional virtual address space isolation mechanism that
provides security page table for the kernel mode. It is the dedicated memory
region for the execution of the kernel protection method and segregation from
the kernel page table [10].
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2.4 Threat Model
Herein, we postulate that a threat model (i.e., an adversary) executing a kernel
vulnerability attack corrupts the kernel memory only in the kernel mode. The
adversary’s goal is to execute any control of the OS kernel using administrator
privileges. Although the adversary is a normal user, the adversary’s user process
changes the page table switching function on the kernel page table of the MKM,
the LSM hook function pointer variable for disabling the MAC, and a credential
variable through kernel vulnerability. It enables the adversary’s user process to
insert malicious code in the kernel memory. Consequently, the adversary gains
complete administrator privileges on the OS kernel.
A limitation of a memory corruption is that the kernel vulnerability and the
victim kernel code and data must be on the same virtual address space of the
page table. This attack cannot overwrite other virtual address spaces of the page
tables, which restricts access to the kernel and memory management unit.
3 Design and Implementation
3.1 Goal of Multiple Kernel Memory
The primary goal of the MKM is to prevent the subversion of kernel protection
methods that keep to restrict access to complete administrator capabilities at
the kernel layer.
– Concept of protecting kernel protection methods
Kernel protection methods face threats on the kernel memory, because
the adversary collapses kernel protection methods and bypasses accurate
privilege-checking, which is performed for all user processes. To mitigate
kernel memory corruption, it is essential to secure memory management and
allocation for the execution of kernel code and for storing kernel data. It
also necessary to segregate kernel protection methods and these kernel code
invocation placement from vulnerable kernel code at the running kernel.
3.2 Challenge and Overview
To achieve the goal of MKM, which makes provision for the challenge of kernel
resilience.
– Securing of kernel protection methods
To automatically corresponds to the isolated processing of kernel features,
kernel resilience is to manually assign the set of kernel protection methods
code, page table function code, and other kernel code are on different virtual
address spaces. This mechanism ensures that the kernel code is forcefully
accessed and executed. Thereafter, kernel code could only cause a pollution
of memory corruption to their virtual address space.
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Fig. 2. Overview of multiple kernel memories.
To overcome this challenge, MKM (Figure 2) comprises two dedicated page
tables: the trampoline page table and the security page table. The MKM kernel
automatically switches to the page table that is suitable for the processing of
specific kernel code of the kernel protection method in the kernel mode. The
kernel protection method covers the kernel memory region of the security page
table to achieve feature responsibilities. These page tables were derived using
different memory architectures from the latest kernels such as Linux with KPTI
possesses kernel and user page tables.
An overview of the role of the proposed page tables is provided below:
Trampoline: The trampoline page table acts as the gateway of the transition
between the user mode and the kernel mode. It causes an invariably
switch from other page tables to the trampoline page table. Moreover,
it facilitates page table switching functions.
Security: The security page table supports kernel code and kernel data that
constructs the features of kernel protection methods. These kernel
codes are only executed on virtual address spaces of the security
page table, thereby forcing acceptance of the in and out transition
with the trampoline page table.
3.3 Page Table Switching Sequence
MKM involves three switching sequences between multiple page tables for
processing each kernel feature (Figure 3). Additionally, MKM ensures that the
trampoline page table is inserted to a middle position of each sequence, as
described below:
Sequence 1: User
1−→ Trampoline 2−→ Security 3−→ Trampoline 4−→ Kernel
Sequence 1 is a system call invocation or exception request that
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Fig. 3. Overview of page table switching sequences
triggers a transition from the user mode to the kernel mode.
Simultaneously, it involves a change from the user to the kernel
page tables, through the trampoline and security page tables. Thus,
executing the kernel protection methods before the kernel feature
deals with the request of user process.
Sequence 2: Kernel
5−→ Trampoline 6−→ Security 7−→ Trampoline 8−→ Kernel
Sequence 2 is the invocation of the kernel protection method
invocation during kernel processing. It is the switch from the kernel
page table to the security page table, through the trampoline page
table.
Sequence 3: Kernel
9−→ Trampoline 10−→ Security 11−→ Trampoline 12−→ User
Sequence 3 is the return to the user mode from the kernel mode. It
involves the switching from the kernel page table to the user page
table, through the trampoline and security page tables. It executes
kernel protection methods after the kernel features have completed
the request of the user process.
3.4 Kernel Attack Surface
A kernel vulnerability attack can result in the corruption of the memory of other
kernel code or data stored in the same virtual address space in the kernel mode.
The adversary uses vulnerable kernel code containing adversary-injected
attack code disrupts the switching to the security page table. It intercepts the
execution of the kernel protection method on the page table switching during
sequence 2 and the sequence 3. This occurs during kernel processing and after
the system call invocation. Sequence 1 remains unaffected because the page
table switching function, kernel protection methods, and data are stored in the
trampoline and security page tables. Thus, executing kernel protection method
prior to the system call execution enables protection against attacks.
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Fig. 4. Timing of switching page table
3.5 MKM Implementation
The proposed MKM was implemented on Linux using KPTI and SCI and the
x86 64 CPU architecture.
Page Table Management
The MKM adopts KPTI and SCI, which have pre-assigned virtual address
spaces, and assigns them as the user and kernel page tables, respectively,
for kernel feature processing. The MKM introduces the trampoline and the
security page tables that support the gateway of page table switching and kernel
protection methods. Each process shares the security page table. In this study,
the proposed kernel memory monitoring feature was executed on the security
page table.
MKM employs a variable pgd of the structure init_mm as the initial value
of the trampoline page table. The security page table adopts a four page size
OR physical address from the variable pgd. The user page table utilizes a one
page size XOR (4 Kbytes on x86 64) physical address from the variable pgd.
MKM sets the kernel page table to the variable kernel_pgd of mm_struct of the
task_struct structure.
Switching of Page Table
MKM selects a suitable page tables for the execution of kernel code for specific
virtual address spaces (Figure 4). The implementation of switching sequences is
described below:
Sequence 1: User
1−→ Trampoline 2−→ Security 3−→ Trampoline 4−→ Kernel
To transition from the user mode to the kernel mode. MKM uses
the SWITCH_KPTI_CR3 function, which writes the physical address of
the trampoline page table to the CR3 register. MKM also employs
SWITCH_SECURITY_CR3 to write the physical address of the security
page table to the CR3 register, and then back to the trampoline
page table after executing the kernel protection methods. Moreover,
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Fig. 5. Monitoring target of kernel code on the MKM
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 writes a physical address of the kernel page table
on the trampoline page table
Sequence 2: Kernel
5−→ Trampoline 6−→ Security 7−→ Trampoline 8−→ Kernel
During kernel processing, MKM utilizes SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 and
SWITCH_SECURITY_CR3 to switch to the security page table through
the trampoline page table, for the execution of kernel protection
methods.
Sequence 3: Kernel
9−→ Trampoline 10−→ Security 11−→ Trampoline 12−→ User
For the transition from the kernel mode to the user mode, MKM
uses SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 to write the physical address of the
trampoline page table to the CR3 register. Moreover, MKM also uses
SWITCH_SECURITY_CR3 and SWITCH_KPTI_CR3 that to writes the user
page table to the CR3 register through the security and trampoline
page tables, for the execution of kernel protection methods.
Monitoring of Virtual Address Space
The kernel observation mechanism monitors the kernel module, LSM
variables, and page table switching functions for MKM (Figure 5). To ensure
accuracy of the monitoring data, the kernel observation mechanism identifies
the virtual addresses of the target kernel code and data containing the
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 virtual address was specified on the kernel page table.
Subsequently, it copies these monitoring data to the security page table as valid
data, at the time of booting.
MKM enables timing the execution of the kernel protection method before
and after the invocation of the system call and to interrupt kernel processing. The
kernel observation mechanism involving MKM begins monitoring and compares
the target data with the valid data on the security page table to determine if
memory corruption has occurred.
Case Study of Page Table Switching Attack
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Fig. 6. Attack and detection flow of attacking user process using kernel vulnerability
The attack on the MKM kernel aims to completely disrupt the entire
kernel protection method. In this study, the eBPF kernel vulnerability
CVE-2017-16995 [12] PoC code that employs the map_update_elem function
of kernel/bpf/syscall.c to exploit the kernel is considered. The adversary is
able to write any restricted virtual address space of the kernel page table. It
is considered that the attacking user process only succeeds in corrupting the
SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 switching function of the kernel page table (Figure 6). This
indicates that the MKM kernel directory switches from the kernel page table to
the user page table.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Purpose and Environment of the Evaluation
The evaluation items and objectives are described as follows:
E1: Monitoring memory corruption of LSM with MKM
The identification and measurement times of the memory corruption
overwriting the function pointer of LSM were evaluated. The kernel
observation mechanism determined if the target memory region was valid,
based on the security page table of MKM.
E2: Monitoring memory corruption of the page table switching feature
The identification and measurement times of the memory corruption of
the page table switching function on the kernel page table were evaluated.
The kernel observation mechanism preserves detection capability and then
inspects whether the target memory region is valid after memory corruption.
E3: Measurement of system call invocation overhead
We measure the effect of kernel feasibility. A benchmark software is used to
calculate the overhead of system call latency.
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E4: Measurement of application overhead
We measure the performance overhead of a web application process using a
benchmark software on MKM, which adopts several page tables switching.
The effectiveness of MKM was evaluated on the target implementation, Linux
kernel 4.4.114 was used for monitoring and Linux kernel 5.0.0 was used for the
performance evaluation. The Linux distribution used was Debian 9.0; the SCI
was ported to kernel 4.4.114, and the CVE-2017-16995 PoC code was modified
to handle any virtual addresses. The evaluation environment for stand alone and
the server is a physical machine equipped with an Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-7700HQ
(2.80 GHz, x86 64) processor and 16 GB DDR4 memory. The client machine is
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 4200U (1.6 GHz), with 8 GB of memory and running
Windows 10. The network environment for the application benchmark uses 1
Gbps hub supporting different ports for server and client physical machines.
4.2 Monitoring memory corruption of LSM with MKM
The eBPF kernel attack uses CVE-2017-16995 [12] to disable the LSM feature
on Linux, it modifies the LSM hook function pointer of selinux_hooks to the
virtual address of the original kernel module function at the sys_bpf system call
invocation. MKM allows the kernel observation mechanism stores the valid data
at the kernel boot and runs an inspection scheme before and after the system call
invocation. It compares the target virtual address with the valid virtual address
on the security page table; thereafter, it outputs the result to log messages.
On identifying memory corruption, log messages are presented as “Invalid
LSM function is detected” and “Virtual Address (Invalid).” The kernel
observation mechanism employing MKM accurately identifies the invalid LSM
function pointer (Figure 7). The attack occurs on the virtual address space of
the kernel page table; subsequently, MKM switches to the security page table
through the trampoline page table, enabling the kernel protection method to
detect and identify the actual attack within 0.0049 ms after the kernel executes
the PoC kernel code.
4.3 Monitoring memory corruption of the page table switching
The eBPF kernel attack also uses CVE-2017-16995 [12] to modify the page table
switching function pointer SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 to the virtual address of the
kernel module function. It compromises sequence 3 of switching from the kernel
to the trampoline page table. The kernel observation mechanism with MKM
identifies the memory corruption by presenting the log messages of “Invalid
vmem switching function is detected” and “Virtual Address (Invalid).”
The kernel observation mechanism with MKM also accurately identifies and
shows that the attack overwrites the function pointer of SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 to
the kernel module function pointer on the kernel page table (Figure 8).
After the attack, the MKM was unable to switch to the security page table
from the kernel page table through the trampoline page table. Moreover, the
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Fig. 7. Monitoring result for the memory corruption of LSM function pointer
Fig. 8. Monitoring result for the memory corruption of page table switching function
MKM directory is changed to the user page table from the kernel page table.
Although the inspection was successfully prevented after the attack, the other
inspections prior to system call invocation remain unaffected and detected it
within 0.0039 ms after the kernel executed the attack system call.
4.4 Measurement of System Call Invocation Overhead
Wemeasured the performance overhead that compares the Linux kernel using the
MKM mechanism and a vanilla Linux kernel. We executed the lmbench software
ten times to determine the system call overhead effect from the average score.
The result is the switching cost of the page tables for each system call invocation
(Table 1). The result of lmbench contains different counts of system calls invoked
for each system call. fork+/bin/sh has 54; fork+execve has four; fork+exit and
open/close have two invocations; and the others have one invocation. Table
1 demonstrates that the system calls with the highest overhead are fork+exit
(0.5445 µs, 100.91%) and the lowest overheads are write (0.020 µs, 109.05%).
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Table 1. Overhead of MKM mechanism on the Linux kernel (µs)
System call Vanilla kernel MKM kernel Overhead
fork+/bin/sh 517.839 524.383 6.544 (101.26%)
fork+execve 133.954 134.823 0.869 (100.65%)
fork+exit 120.214 121.303 1.089 (100.91%)
open/close 3.070 3.226 0.156 (105.08%)
read 0.264 0.285 0.021 (107.95%)
write 0.221 0.241 0.020 (109.05%)
stat 1.095 1.128 0.033 (103.01%)
fstat 0.286 0.306 0.020 (106.99%)
Table 2. ApacheBench overhead of MKM mechanism on the Linux kernel (µs).
File size (KB) Vanilla kernel MKM kernel Overhead
1 1,637.08 1,833.35 196.27 (111.99%)
10 1,868.17 2,542.07 673.9 (136.07%)
100 3,709.58 1,0395.31 6,685.73 (280.23%)
4.5 Measurement of Application Overhead
We compared the user process overhead between the vanilla kernel and
MKM kernel. The user process used here is the Apache 2.4.25 web server.
The benchmark software is ApacheBench 2.4. The ApacheBench calculates a
download request average of 100,000 HTTP accesses to file sizes of 1 KB, 10
KB, and 100 KB in one connection. Table 2 demonstrates that MKM has an
average overhead of 196.27 µs (111.99%) to 6685,73 µs (280.23%) for each file
download access of 100,000 HTTP sessions. ApacheBench relies on the total
count of system call invocations in the user process. The ApacheBench result
shows that a small file requires a low overhead factor whereas large files increase
the overhead factor.
We consider that the file transfer depends on the number of system call
invocations. Numerous system call invocations increase the switching of page
tables and cause additional processing time.
5 Discussion
5.1 Evaluation Consideration
During the evaluation, our kernel observation mechanism used the MKM security
page table. Although the eBPF kernel vulnerability attack successfully modified
the page table switching function on the kernel page table, thereby disabling one
of the MKM mechanisms, it did not affect the rest of the MKM mechanisms.
The MKM continued to run our kernel observation mechanism on the security
page table from the trampoline page table before the system call invocation at
the kernel layer. Moreover, it is difficult for the adversary to evade the inspection
timing before the system call invocation of the kernel observation mechanism,
after the adversary program has already compromised the host.
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5.2 Limitations
When an actual kernel vulnerability PoC (e.g., CVE-2017-16995) attempts to
defeat part of the MKM mechanism, MKM can not invoke kernel protection
methods after the memory corruption caused by the system call invocation.
To enhance kernel resilience and protect specific kernel code and data, MKM
provides two dedicated page tables at the kernel layer to restrict the attack to
the entire kernel memory. The MKM supports the kernel protection method and
the normal feature kernel code assigned on each individual page table. Therefore,
the MKM complicates the access to the virtual address spaces of trampoline and
security page tables when the vulnerable kernel code affects its virtual address
space. The MKM relies on the accomplishing memory isolation through page
tables. Thus, kernel protection methods or the kernel driver should satisfy the
requirements for creating suitable isolation granularity on the MKM mechanism.
5.3 Performance Consideration
We consider the performance overhead resulting from the MKM handling
multiple page tables for executing suitable processes on the running kernel. MKM
enables tag-based TLBs, which reduces the performance overhead. The Linux
KPTI mechanism, SCI, and MKM use the PCID of TLB. The cache on TLBs
improves the physical memory access without a page table walk to identify the
targeted page, which only requires the CR3 update.
The performance effect involves the switching of page tables, followed by the
CR3 register access. MKM maintains the application process without overhead
in the user mode. An overhead cost appears when the switching occurs in the
kernel mode after the system call invocation from the user mode. In addition,
the kernel typically only switches the user page table at the context switch of
each process, whereas KPTI switches between the kernel and user page tables
at each transition between the user mode and the kernel mode. The trampoline
and security kernel page tables provided by MKM require additional overheads
to switch page tables in the kernel mode.
5.4 Portability Consideration
We consider the capability of the MKM mechanism on other OSs. FreeBSD,
which adopts page table isolation [14], is an accepted Linux implementation
similar to the MKM approach. Therefore, additional CPU architectures can be
realized in the future, to validate the use of multiple kernel page tables.
6 Related Work
Kernel protection for privilege management. SELinux [7] and Capability
[15] restrict the granularity of root privilege of user process, which reduces the
harmful effects of a compromised host.
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Kernel Protection for running kernel. Software based running kernel
protection involves stack monitoring [1], randomization of kernel memory layout
using KASLR [4], kernel control flow integrity [2], randomize the virtual address
of the page table position [16], to mitigate a kernel attack with arbitrary program
or ROP code snippets execution. In addition, kRˆX are exclusive management
methods that directly protect kernel code and kernel image data on the kernel
memory [17]. Moreover, hardware based running kernel protection adopts trusted
computing base (TCB) verifies the firmware and kernel validation at start up and
protects them using tamper-proof features [18]. Sprobes uses the CPU security
features and provides a trusted execution environment [19].
Kernel monitoring. SecVisor and TrustVisor are hypervisors that monitor
the kernel as the guest OS preserves the integrity of the kernel code and data
[20, 21]. SIM inserts the monitoring mechanism into a guest OS memory space to
achieve real-time kernel behavior inspection [22]. ED-Monitor is a kernel module
that handles register management to enable hypervisor monitoring [23]. GRIM
supports a kernel protection mechanism on the GPU device [24].
Kernel vulnerability suppression. The seL4 micro-kernel provides a
small set of kernel-level functionality with formal verification of memory
management to restrain memory invalidation and other vulnerability [25].
In addition, kernel memory fuzzing is the technique of discovering
mis-implementations that result in vulnerabilities; kmemcheck [26] and KASAN
[27] with syzbot and syzkaller [28] automatically inspect the memory handling
processes on the kernel memory mechanism.
Reducing kernel memory attack surface. Separation of user and kernel
memory using KPTI [5] and separation of the kernel memory using the extended
page table are available on Intel CPUs [29]. KRAZOR reduces the visible kernel
code list to the user process [30], KASR handles an execution permission at page
granularity for user process [31], Additionally, PerspicuOS provides intra-kernel
privilege separation to support isolation management at the kernel layer [32].
Multik prepares the minimum kernel code mapping of kernel memory for each
application [33], and KMO provides the dedicated page table for executing
specific kernel codes and data, to prevent failure of the kernel protection method
[10]. Kernel multi-variant execution (kMVX) provides differential virtual address
space and stack behaviors; anomalous process behavior is identified based on the
success or failure of attacks in these environments [34].
The security features of MKM and previous research mechanisms were
considered. Kernel protection for privilege management and running kernel
provides effective kernel protection at each layer. Moreover, kernel monitoring
using Hypervisor or a hardware layer (e.g., CPU) protection ensures integrity
and enhances monitoring capability. By reducing the kernel memory attack
surface, MKM provides an alternative attack mitigation method that separates
or minimizes the kernel memory, to mitigate the attack code execution
through kernel vulnerability and protect security features in the kernel memory
mechanisms. Kernel vulnerability suppression automatically complements the
additional kernel features. The fuzzing technique identifies mis-implementations
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Table 3. Reducing kernel memory attack surface comparison (✓ is supported; △ is
partially supported).
Feature KRAZOR[30] KASR [31] PerspicuOS [32] Multik [33] KMO[10] MKM
Page table switching protection ✓
Isolated kernel protection method △ △ ✓ ✓
Memory corruption mitigation via system call ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ △ △
Reducing executable kernel code ✓ ✓ ✓
Reducing kernel code from page table ✓ △ △
of additional features and the formal verification approach subsequently ensures
that anomalous control flow behavior is excluded. Kernel security capabilities
are enhanced and restricted to realize multiple layer security quality using a
combination of these research methods.
6.1 Comparison with Related Work
Based on a comparison of the security features of MKM and those of five reducing
kernel attack mechanisms (Table 3) [30–33, 10] , MKM satisfies a majority of the
attack mitigation requirements for the running kernel.
KRAZOR [30] initially collects necessary kernel features for a targeted
program and subsequently enforces the result at the deployment phase during
user process execution. Moreover, KASR [31] builds up a kernel code database
during the offline training of the targeted program; thereafter, the executable
kernel codes are employed for the execution of the user process from the
hypervisor layer. Although KRAZOR forcibly minimizes callable kernel functions
and KASR executes kernel functions at the running kernel to mitigate kernel
attacks from user processes, these approach do not separate the kernel memory
at each kernel feature.
PerspicuOS [32] supports isolation techniques of privilege for multiple kernel
components. PerspicuOS ensures that nested kernel (trusted) contains a small
part of kernel code and data, and the outer kernel (untrusted) contains the
rest of the kernel with de-privileging. The nested kernel exclusively manages
hardware privilege operations (e.g., MMU and CPU registers) for the protection
of illegal memory corruption. Although MKM does not support hardware
privilege deduction, MKM completely separates the virtual address space as
a page table for the kernel code. We consider that MKM covers the entry gate of
the Application Binary Interface (ABI) to a user process, and porting to other
OSes at the kernel layer.
Multik [33] profiles the necessary kernel codes that are generated for a
customized kernel image and then allocates a minimized kernel as the page
table of each application. KMO [10] assigns specific portions of kernel codes to
dedicated page tables for the isolation from complete kernel codes. Multik and
KMO ensure that the independent page table is safeguarded from the effects
of memory corruption. However, the invocation codes of the kernel protection
method (e.g., page table switching function) are still assigned to the kernel page
table with vulnerable kernel code.
These kernel memory layers attack mitigation approaches, similar to the
capability of MKM. The MKM architecture focuses on strongly separating
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specific kernel codes at the earliest stage of the kernel protection method, through
the invocation of system calls or kernel feature processing. Additionally, MKM
does not support the kernel code reducing method for the user process; it needs
to be combined with the MKM approach to achieve a more flexible adjustment
of the page table assignment.
7 Conclusion
An OS kernel should be able to mitigate various attacks that exploit the kernel
vulnerabilities. In general, kernels adopt stack monitoring, CFI, KASLR, KPTI,
and KMO to minimize the attack surface and prevent the kernel vulnerabilities
from being attacked. However, adversaries could utilize privilege escalation to
subvert kernel protection methods and these kernel codes invocation by executing
arbitrary code and exploiting the vulnerabilities at the kernel layer.
In this study, a novel security mechanism Multiple Kernel Memory (MKM) is
proposed to provide two dedicated page tables: the trampoline and security page
tables. MKM encapsulates the vulnerable kernel code in the kernel page table;
thereafter, it assigns the page table switching function and kernel protection
methods in the trampoline and security page tables to reduce the potential
kernel attack surface. It ensures that kernel protection methods and vulnerable
kernel code are executed on different virtual address spaces; this improves the
resilient against memory corruption because kernel attacks can not target to the
trampoline and security page tables. The evaluation of Linux using MKM could
prevent the memory corruption of kernel protection methods. Additionally, our
kernel observation mechanism works on the MKM implementation, which detects
the memory corruption of the LSM hook function and page table switching
function. Based on the performance evaluation, the overhead was 0.020 µs to
0.5445 µs for each system call invocation on the proposed kernel; moreover, the
web client program overhead average for MKM was 196.27 µs to 6,685.73 µs,for
each download access of 100,000 HTTP sessions.
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